What happened in Poland?

According to the American media, not much.

After the October 15, 2023, parliamentary election, the Law and Justice (PiS) party, which had been ruling since 2015, lost the majority in Sejm, the Polish parliament. On December 13, a new coalition took over. Donald Tusk, the former president of the European Council, became the new prime minister.

Changes like that always happen in democratic countries. From far away, it might look like nothing unusual. I was in Poland during those critical days in December for unrelated reasons and saw that, for Poles, it was an event of historical dimensions.

As an Americanized Pole, I got drawn into the emotions of the day but also saw the broader perspective. In recent years, we have observed the re-emergence of right-wing populism. It is Trump in the U.S. and Orban in Hungary. In Poland, it was the Law and Justice party. And it lost to people standing firmly for a reason. The story of Tusk winning is worth telling.

Is Poland’s change special?

Not much, but lengthy democratic traditions might play a role. In medieval times, Poles translated the Latin res publica, which means a state as a common good in Latin, as rzeczpospolita, making the term republic sound more familiar. Before its collapse in 1795, Poland and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, for about five centuries, were unprecedented democracies. That tradition of seeing public matters as a common good was strong when I was growing up in Poland, and it showed up during the recent power transition.

After WWII, Poland ended up in the Soviet sphere of influence, but even Stalin did not dare deprive Poles of some pretenses of authentic democracy. I was among those who, in the 1970s, explored scraps of the freedom of expression we had, to pave a better future. It paid off in 1989 when Poland freed itself from the Soviet domination.

Poles were united against the socialistic government

In the 1980s, the Polish economy completely disintegrated. It was a version of what one can read about Venezuela now. Seeing their own inability to manage the economy, the rulers encouraged Poles to open small businesses. Most people still held their government jobs but had some economic activity on the side. The black market was buzzing.

In previous years, the government limited travel abroad, fearing people would not return. In the 1980s, that policy was reversed. People disappointed with socialism were encouraged to emigrate. Some left and supported their families back in Poland. I left in 1985 after getting a few “suggestions” that it would be better for me to go.

Parallel to that, the government eased traveling abroad. Poles soon figured out which Polish products they could sell for a profit abroad and which foreign products they could sell in Poland. The so-called suitcase trade flourished. With the economy disintegrating, Poles needed to become entrepreneurial to survive. Some even figured out how to enrich themselves. But the abnormality of the situation was obvious.

There was unanimous consent that the socialist government should go, and there was a sigh of relief when it happened in 1989. But then the stairs began.

It is harder to be for than against something

The entire nation was so fed up with the disarray of the socialistic economy that, in 1989, the first government in free Poland was strictly for capitalism. Many Poles saw firsthand shelves full of products in capitalistic countries while suffering shortages of almost everything in Poland. So, the choice was obvious. Regrets came soon after, and they are lingering until now.

Prof. Leszek Balcerowicz was the first finance minister. He is a renowned economist with a libertarian streak. His “shock therapy” was aimed at privatizing the government-run economy.

The government-operated businesses were inefficient and unable to survive in the free market economy. Balcerowicz cut off subsidies except for selected large, strategic corporations. The mantra of the day was that if someone could save a bankrupting business and get it going and people employed, it was worth selling it, even for the symbolic, one Polish złoty. Soon, people noticed that many of the buyers were old-time managers.

For business-minded people, it was obvious. Under socialism, many managers were competent experts operating in an absurd system. After 1989, they were the best prepared to prosper. And many did. They quickly modernized the companies they took over. Rebuilding the businesses, they reached for the newest technologies from abroad, taking foreign partners or selling the businesses they took over. Many of them enriched themselves hastily.

That did not go well in public opinion because making enterprises efficient meant firing unneeded or poorly performing employees. Under socialism, unemployment was illegal, and the government guaranteed employment for everyone. That ended, and in 1991, unemployment was 10% and growing. It peaked at 20%. It fell below 10% 25 years later, when those who grew up under socialism and could not adjust to capitalism retired.

Also, people with a nationalistic leaning did not like foreigners buying Polish businesses. Germans were the closest neighbors and had everything Poland might need. It did not help when Germans were the buyers.

On political grounds, in 1989, the first post-socialist Polish government promoted the policy of the “thick line.” The concept was to put behind old political divisions and avoid petty revenge on those who were a part of the old regime. Only individuals who committed criminal acts against political opponents should be persecuted. And barely a few were.

It opened a split in the previously united political formation. Many demanded a much stricter treatment of the apparatchiks of the former regime, especially as some benefited from the transformation.

Before 1989, the secret police had a network of informers. I recall people I barely knew who suddenly engaged me in lengthy political discussions. Some might have been genuinely interested; others might have been on an assignment. I could not know, and regardless of how careful I was, I had no control over what they wrote in their reports.

The split after 1989 was rooted in economic decisions, but political issues such as support for the least fortunate, reckoning with the previous rulers and their collaborators, and nationalism became hot issues.

Pragmatism versus populism

Looking back, one must give Balcerowicz credit for a swift transformation from a centralized, inefficient economy to a market-driven one. The policy gave a lot of freedom to industrious and entrepreneurial individuals, who thrived and soon could afford new cars, better housing, and travel abroad. On a macro scale, Poland looked like a marvel, outperforming economies of major European countries like Germany, France, and the United Kingdom during the crisis of 2008-10.

Analysts also noticed that after 1989, the Polish economy outperformed the economic growth of the former East Germany. Before 1989, the dysfunctional economy forced Poles to be entrepreneurial. They put that streak in high drive when opportunities opened. Before 1990, the economy of East Germany was in much better shape than the Polish one, but it was behind West Germany’s. After the unification, East Germans were less entrepreneurial in taking on new opportunities and more passively waiting for support from the wealthy West.

But not all Poles were doing well financially. I recall our high school class reunion meetings. About one-third of the attendees were financially struggling. They could not adjust to the new reality. Some worked too long in dysfunctional institutions. Their professional knowledge was outdated, and they had no energy or savvy to catch up. Some never learned basic workmanship skills. Lastly, too often, they reached for alcohol to ease their frustrations. They were unemployable in the modern economy.

But they voted. For the first several years after regaining independence in 1989, Poland had a carousel of governments formed by almost all possible political factions: free market supporters, social democrats, nationalistic conservatives, and populists. In 2007, Donald Tusk united market-oriented pragmatists, and they ruled for eight years. The opposition united around the Law and Order Party, which presented itself as a voice for those left behind. In 2014, Tusk was lured into taking the position of president of the European Council, and in the following year’s election, his party lost to PiS.

I recall that before the elections in 2015, I read in “Polityka,” a reputable Polish weekly, a well-documented study proving that after the system transformation, proportionally, the poorest in Poland gained more than those well off. Those less fortunate felt they deserved more and gave PiS eight years, which ended after its defeat in the October 15, 2023, election.

Why did PiS lose this time?

Polish dilemmas have been the same as America’s since the beginning of the 20^th century.

Should the government prioritize assisting entrepreneurial individuals with the calculation that they advance the economy, create new jobs, and, as a result, lift the welfare and strength of the nation? Or should we assume that those talented and affluent individuals can fare well on their own, and the government should assist those less fortunate and protect them from the greed of the rich and powerful?

The correct answer is that the government should do neither of the abovementioned options. It should observe and execute the laws so the rich cannot abuse the power of the purse to take advantage of the weaker ones, and the poorer ones cannot use the power of the majority to fetter the economy. That was the message of Donald Tusk. The future will tell how that plan will be executed.

During its eight years, PiS took the populistic course. Its support was mostly from poorer eastern Poland, and communities there received more government support. In terms of achieving social goals, the PiS government was more directly involved in the economy. It put its people on the boards of government-controlled corporations. It inflated government administration with bogus positions, often given to party supporters and family members.

Usually, the more government gets into the economy, the more corrupt it becomes. There are many accusations, but PiS dismissed them when it was in charge. One of the most recent ones got worldwide attention when Polish truckers blocked the border crossings with Ukraine.

After the Russians ended allowing the shipments of Ukrainian grain through the Black Sea, it was obvious to ship it via land to Polish ports on the Baltic Sea. It did not go as planned. Some local Polish businesses associated with PiS bought that grain at a lower price than from local Polish farmers. Corrupt Poles seeking to make a quick buck overlooked the fact that Ukrainian grain was of a commercial grade, which means a lower purity than needed for food production. Polish mills did not want to buy it.

Some of the Ukrainian goods transported to Polish ports were transported by trucks. Ukrainian truckers got an exemption from strict EU regulations to make that transit. Again, in Poland, some of them, besides delivering Ukrainian goods to Polish ports, took some delivery jobs inside Poland. It was probably hard to avoid, but as with that grain trade, it became a big issue because corrupt politicians allowed it. But the message to the world was that it was Ukraine’s fault.

PiS leaders believed in their morally superior mission. Hence, they lost their patience when the opposition tried to stop some of their actions as inconsistent with the Constitution. They used parliamentary tricks to change the Constitutional Tribunal unconstitutionally. That got them in trouble with the European Union, which stopped payment of 134 billion euros allocated to assist Poland’s economic development.

Poland has a public radio and TV service run by the government. PiS turned that into its party propaganda. As that service has better off-air coverage than competing commercial services, it is often the sole news source in the countryside, where fewer people can access cable TV. In this way, the PiS electorate there had limited access to the voice of the opposition.

During my visits to Poland, I mostly watched the commercial TVN24, owned by Warner Bros. Discovery. My favored political show was with a moderator in the center, three politicians from the ruling party on his right, and three from the opposition on his left. I could hear PiS representatives’ haughtiness, ignorance, and demagoguery. In most cases, it contrasted with the more rational reasoning of their opponents.

Compared to the American media, no one lectured me about who is bad and who is good. Also, the moderators focused on pinpointing the weaknesses of both sides. I did not see them favoring one side, which is typical in the American media. I found it refreshing. The media outlet sounded trustworthy.

Donald Tusk showed leadership talent in uniting the opposing parties into a joint coalition against PiS. But he could not have done it without the professionalism of the Polish media; I mention TVN24 as the most influential one.

It is something worth considering when trying to overcome the political divisions in America.